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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a general tendency on the part of most strategists 
and defense specialists to measure a state's capability in terms of a 
meticulous calculation of the quantities and qualities of the armed forces 
and weapons systems. Some have gone so far as to claim that the study of 
power in the last analysis is "the study of the capacity to wage war."' 
Furthermore, it is assumed by most of these specialists that leaders of 
nations-states are rational and that rational leaders do not resort to war 
if they think that they will lose. Bueno de Mesquita, for example, argues 
that "By assuming that leaders of nations are strong, rational calculators 
of expected utility, I showed that nations initiate war only if there is the 
expectation of a net increase in utility from war as compared to the utility 
derived from maintaining the status quo...."2 
From these assumptions, such specialists draw the seemingly logical 
conclusion that the only sure method of preventing a challenge or ensur-
ing the attainment of goals in interstate relations is to build bigger and 
better military forces and armaments, that is, divisions, tanks, military 
aircraft, anti-aircraft systems, missiles, bombs, etc. 
It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that there are some 
fundamental difficulties involved with these assumptions and, conse-
quently, with the conclusion predicated upon them. The Iran-Iraq War 
will be used to shed some light on the nature of these difficulties, but the 
empirical evidence against the stated conclusion is already impressive in a 
number of benchmark cases. The United States' overwhelming economic 
and military superiority did not prevent either a challenge by the forces 
of North Vietnam and Vietcong or the U.S. inability to achieve its goals 
despite a long and costly war. Nor has the overwhelming superiority of 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan so far prevented the mounting of a per-
sistent challenge from a band of irregular and poorly armed Mujahedeen 
and their frustration of the Soviet objectives. The United States and 
Israel were not able to attain their goals in Lebanon despite their over-
whelmingly military power, just as the United States was not able to use 
its clear military superiority to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis and to 
prevent it from contributing to the election defeat of an incumbent 
American president. 
Even in the cases where the difference in military power is immense, 
the superiority of one side over the other is not subject to doubt, and the 
territories to be invaded in close physical proximity of the invader, the 
weaker states have not proven "rational" in the above sense by rolling 
over and foregoing challenge to the superior forces.3 In 1971, Iran invad-
ed and occupied three small islands in the Persian Gulf. These were Abu 
Musa, with a population of 300 fishermen, belonging to the Emirate of 
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Sharjah, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, with a total population of 
70, belonging to the Emirate of Ra's al-Khaimah. The combined popula-
tion of the two Emirates was 56,000. According to Muhammad Reza 
Shah, Britain, which was abandoning its protectorate over the Trucial 
Emirates or Sheikhdoms (now the United Arabs Emirates) had agreed 
that Iran would receive these islands in lieu of relinquishing its long 
historical claim to Bahrain in 1970. The Shah's version of negotiations 
was later denied by the British officials.4 In any case, the few policemen 
on the Greater Tunb did resist the indisputably overwhelming Iranian 
forces, there were casualties on both sides, and a good deal of anti-
Iranian sentiment was generated on the part of the Arabs. In 1983, the 
United States, by all accounts the greatest military power in the world, 
invaded Grenada — a small island of 100,000 people, with no air force or 
navy, and with a divided leadership. But Grenada, too, resisted the far 
superior forces and there were losses to both parties. The invasion also 
occasioned condemnation by an overwhelming majority of the United 
Nations. 
THE CAUSES OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
A number of causes for the Iran-Iraq War have been offered by 
Western scholars and journalists. These consist of border disputes, par-
ticularly the status of the Shatt al-Arab; religious and national dif-
ferences; competition for prestige; and ancient animosities.5 Two sets of 
problems tend to characterize such arguments. First, the authors are 
rather selective in the data they present or perceive. For example, in 
presenting the idea of ancient animosities, they conveniently overlook 
the considerably longer periods of cooperation. In stressing cleavages, 
they neglect religious and cultural affinities that have existed between the 
two countries. In emphasizing the policy differences, they tend to 
underestimate the common interests of the two states in oil and in 
OPEC, in modernizing their economies, in resolving their respective Kur-
dish problems and winning the loyalty of their populations, and in main-
taining their independence from incursions by the great powers. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising to find many references to previous dif-
ferences on the Shatt al-Arab but almost no reference to the Sa'dabad 
Pact of 1937, which was concluded between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and 
Afghanistan to bring about non-aggression, mutual consultation, and 
cooperation for ensuring internal and external security among the 
signatories. Neither has there been much reference to Iran's assistance of 
the nationalist government of Rashid Ali al-Gailani in Iraq in 1941, even 
after that government was overthrown through the use of military force 
by Britain and replaced by the latter's supporters. Further, there is 
seldom any comment regarding Iran joining with the other oil producers 
after the nationalization of Iraq Petroleum Company — owned by 
British, Dutch, and American interests — to declare in 1972 that it would 
not allow isolation of Iraq nor would it cooperate with retaliatory 
measures against the latter by the Western oil companies. 
Second, all of the proposed causes of the War had existed between 
the two countries for a long time, certainly for half a century since the 
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independence of Iraq in 1930, but there was no resort to war, despite oc-
casional tensions and border incidents. On the contrary, Muhammad 
Reza Shah and Saddam Hussein had managed to resolve their differences 
through the Algiers Agreement of 1975, and the relationship between the 
two countries had improved substantially by the time of the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-1979.' The most important specific sources of con-
flict between the two states during the Shah's regime consisted of the 
status of the Shatt al-Arab and Iran's military occupation of three 
islands in the Gulf in 1971. Their resolution was for awhile complicated 
by a third and more significant issue, namely, personal frictions and 
ideological differences between the respective elites and their contribu-
tions to each other's internal revolutionary and subversive movements. 
The Shatt al-Arab is formed of the confluence of the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers for a distance of 120 miles before reaching the Gulf. 
The upper part, approximately 65 miles long, is entirely within Iraqi ter-
ritory, while the lower part constitutes the frontier of the two states. The 
Ezerum Treaty of 1847 granted the Ottoman Empire sovereignty over the 
Shatt, while Iran (then known as Persia) was recognized sovereign over 
the east bank and the town and anchorage of Khorramshahr (then 
known as Muhammarah). Although this treaty did not follow the normal 
rule of international law, the thalweg (deep water line) establishing the 
boundary between two states occupying opposite banks of a river, it did 
provide for the free navigation in and use of the river by both parties. 
With the discovery of oil in high quantities in Iran's province of 
Khuzistan (then known as Arabistan) on the east bank of the Shatt, new 
protocols were signed by Britain (which had an interest in the Iranian 
oil), Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Iran. These protocols again 
recognized Ottoman sovereignty on the entire river and its islands, except 
for Abadan which later became an oil terminal and the site for the largest 
refinery in the world, two other islands, and the port and anchorage of 
Khorramshahr. 
With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, 
Iraq, first as a British mandate and subsequently as a independent state, 
inherited the Ottoman rights in the Shatt and in fact exercised them more 
meaningfully than in the Ottoman period. After Reza Shah (1926-1941) 
unified Iran and reduced foreign influence, the dispute between the two 
countries about the Shatt was submitted to the League of Nations in the 
1930s. Iraq insisted that treaties must be respected under international 
law, and Iran argued for the application of the thalweg. The dispute was 
resolved by the Treaty of 1937 which recognized Iraq's sovereignty over 
the river but applied the thalweg in the area of Abadan for a distance of 
five miles.7 The relationship between the two countries improved greatly 
and no major conflict about the Shatt arose for the next two and half 
decades, until after the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy by a 
revolution in 1958 and the emergence of a Republican regime in Iraq. As 
personal frictions and ideological and alliance differences between the 
Shah and the Iraqi elite mounted, the dispute on the boundaries in the 
Shatt also re-emerged. After the construction of the Kharg Island ter-
minal in the Gulf in 1965, the Shah no longer depended on the Shatt for 
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oil export and was more willing to engage Iraq. With a large part of the 
countries' troops concentrated along the southern part of their border, 
the Shah's government condemned the Treaty of 1937 on the ground that 
it was "imposed" on Iran under conditions that no longer existed and 
declared it "null and void" in April of 1969. Iran subsequently escorted 
a freighter with naval units through the waterway to demonstrate its 
"rights." Iraq did not interfere with the movement of Iranian ships but 
refused to recognize the Iranian claims.' 
Another source of conflict was Iran's occupation of the three islands 
at the entrance of the Gulf in 1971. This action was justified by Iran on 
"historical and sentimental" grounds by claiming that Qawasim Sheikhs 
had used the islands in return for payment of tribute to the Iranian 
government and that de jure exercise of Iranian sovereignty had not laps-
ed. The Iraqi government rejected this claim by maintaining that the 
funds paid in the late eighteenth century had been for the privilege of us-
ing the Iranian ports on the eastern shore of the Gulf, not the three 
islands. Furthermore, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Iran and 
Britain, because of the role assumed to have been played by the latter in 
facilitating the occupation through prior negotiations.9 
The two regimes have, particularly in recent years, posed a threat to 
each other. Iran not only supported the Iraqi Kurds in their war with the 
central government in the late 1960s, but also announced after their 
cease-fire of March 1970 that it was ready to assist them again should 
they decide to resume their uprising against the Iraqi government. When 
clashes with the Kurds resumed in 1974, Iraq accused Iran, Israel and the 
United States of arming and inciting the Kurds, an accusation which was 
subsequently denied by the United States. The Shah's government, 
however, was playing a delicate game as Iran has a large Kurdish minori-
ty of its own that has also aspired to autonomy and had established the 
short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1945-1946) during the Soviet 
occupation of northern Iran. 
Iraq also maintained that there were several espionage rings, mann-
ed by Israeli, American and Iranian agents, operating against Iraq from 
Tehran. One of the cases presented by Iraq to support this allegation was 
the 1970 assassination of General Timour Bakhtiar who had been the 
director of SAVAK and had worked as the right hand of the Shah until 
he defected to Iraq and became active against the Shah's regime. Accor-
ding to Iraq, the assassination was carried out by three Israeli-trained 
Iranian intelligence agents who, posing as students, had hijacked an Ira-
nian plane, landed it in Baghdad and had sought and received political 
asylum.10 
Iraq also accused the Shah's regime of suppression and maltreat-
ment of political opposition and ethnic minorities, especially the Arabs 
who inhabit Khuzistan and are scattered along the Gulf coast of Iran. It 
referred to what it regarded as the general Arab character of the Gulf and 
Arabistan (Khuzistan), a term which was in common use before Reza 
Khan (later the Shah) removed Sheikh Khaz'al in the early 1920s and re-
established the authority of the Iranian government over the province. 
The Iranian government, in turn, pointed out the Iraqi 
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government's support for the rural and urban guerrillas in Iran, who 
then constituted the only source of active opposition to the Shah, and 
noted such behavior as the Iraqi authorities' open call to the guerrillas to 
demonstrate the existence of opposition to the Shah's regime by acts of 
sabotage during the visit of President Richard M. Nixon to Iran in 1972. 
Iran was also incensed about the fostering of Arab separatism in the 
south by Iraq and complained about Iraq's expulsion in 1971 of more 
than 50,000 Iranians, who had allegedly been living and working in Iraq 
illegally. 
In addition to the common interests and affinities previously noted, 
however, the two countries had a compelling national interest in preven-
ting a large-scale military clash which might have resulted in a war and 
spelled disaster for both, particularly since most of their wealth — oil 
and gas fields, refineries, petrochemical complexes and ports — was 
located in the most likely war zone. Consequently, the Algiers Accord 
was by no means surprising. 
This paper maintains that the critical factor in the relationship bet-
ween the two countries was then, as it has been during the regime of the 
Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the threat the respective elites posed to 
each other and their sponsorship of subversive activities in each other's 
domain. When the two governments agreed to halt the threats and acts of 
subversion against each other during the Shah's regime, other disputes 
were easily resolved. Iran ceased its support to the rebellious Kurds, who 
subsequently accepted an amnesty granted by Iraq, were defeated, or 
crossed the border into Iran. Iraq, in turn, accepted the thalweg as the 
boundary between the two countries in the Shatt." It is clear from the 
data that, whatever their substance, neither ancient animosities, nor 
competition for prestige, nor a combination of the two prevented an 
agreement and subsequent cooperation between the two states in either 
1975 or 1937. 
Since the nature of the disagreements between the two countries in 
1980 was not different from what it had been in the early 1970s and the 
structure of the Iraqi government was practically the same in the two 
periods, the major difference between the relatively long period in which 
war was avoided and the time it started must be sought in the changed 
nature of the Iranian regime. Iran never agreed to changing its policy of 
attempting to establish an Islamic Republican regime in Iraq, the prere-
quisite for which was the overthrow of the Ba'th government and its 
leader, Saddam Hussein. It is instructive to note that Iraq sent a con-
gratulatory telegram to Khomeini upon his arrival in Tehran and Iraqi 
President Ahamd Hassan al-Bakr indicated willingness to pay him a 
courtesy visit before there was any serious reference to revising the 
Algiers Accord. Both of these gestures were rebuffed by Khomeini. In-
stead, the Iranian government was implicated in the sponsorship of the 
al-Da'wah (the Call, or Invitation) party, in assassination attempts and 
uprisings by the Shiites, and in the designation by Khomeini of the 
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr and, after his execution by the Iraqi 
government in 1981, of the Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Hakim, as the 
future theo-political leader in Iraq.12 The Iraqi government, for its part, 
48 
Conflict Quarterly 
also began to press its sponsorship of the pan-Arab and separatist 
movements in Khuzistan and to turn its propoganda apparatus against 
the Khomeini regime. Despite these developments, a war was avoided as 
long as the moderate cabinet of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan con-
tinued, mainly because deliberate efforts were made to keep the lines of 
communication open and to allay the Iraqi government's apprehensions 
about an Iranian sponsored attempt directed toward its overthrow. 
However, the Bazargan government fell because of the hostage crisis, a 
move planned and executed by his domestic political competitors. Thus, 
one of the major obstacles blocking further deterioration of Iran-Iraq 
relations and the occurrence of war between the two countries was 
eliminated.13 
COSTS, RATIONALITY AND FUNCTIONALITY 
OF RESORT TO FORCE 
The Iraqi invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980 was the formal 
beginning of a long and major war which is currently in its fifth year. 
The course of the war may be divided into five rather distinct phases for 
the purpose of analysis.'4 
The first phase, September 22 to November 15, 1980, was 
characterized by Iraq's military initiative which enabled it to penetrate 
into the Iranian territory. The three main theatres of activity consisted 
of: the northern sector, in Kurdistan; the central sector, in Kermanshah 
and Luristan (between Qasr-e Shirin and Mehran); and the southern sec-
tor, in Khuzistan. The penetration of Iranian territory in the first two 
sectors did not exceed ten miles at its advanced positions. In the south, or 
the main theatre of this war, Iraqi forces captured a land area about sixty 
miles wide. This area included the port city of Khorramshahr, which fell 
after a month of desperate house to house fighting and constituted the 
main Iraqi accomplishment. 
The second phase, November 15 to May 1981, was a short-term 
stalemate characterized by the rainy season of November to March and 
the Iraqi efforts to capture Abadan island. These efforts failed because 
of the nature of the terrain, the overwhelming superiority of the Iranian 
navy, and the apparent unwillingness of Saddam Hussein to risk the 
estimated losses of manpower and matériel. The invading forces were 
also unable to complete their siege of the city or shell it into surrender. 
The third phase, June 1981 through May 1982, consisted of Iran's 
counter-offensive to expel the invading forces from its territory. Fighting 
on its own soil, Iran managed to acquire an advantageous military posi-
tion in early 1982 and by May 25 Khorramshahr was regained and an 
estimated 12,000 Iraqi military personnel were taken as prisoners. The 
counter-offensive was thus quite successful and along most of the front 
the Iraqi forces were driven back to the border. In some instances, the 
Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory and in others the Iraqis remained on 
Iranian soil, but the extent of penetration in these cases was insignificant. 
The fourth phase, June through October 1982, was characterized by 
Iran's invasion of Iraq's territory in order to defeat the enemy and 
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change its government. The first major offensive of this phase was laun-
ched against the port city of Basra on July 14, employing the previously 
successful human wave tactic, through the use of which inexperienced 
volunteers attempted to clear the minefields and bore the brunt of the 
Iraqi punishment before the Pasdaran-e Enghelab (Revolutionary 
Guards) and the army regulars entered the battle. Yet, the Iraqis had 
learned well from their previous experiences with this tactic and showed 
much more capability in defending their homeland than they had 
demonstrated in Iran. Even the Shiite soldiers proved to be considerably 
more dedicated in defense than they had been in invasion. This Iranian 
offensive, as well as the five subsequent attacks in as many weeks, failed 
to crumble the Iraqi defenses. On September 30, another major offensive 
was launched in the central sector of the front, relatively close to 
Baghdad. This offensive, too, soon ground to a halt without resulting in 
any meaningful gain. Although Iran did not achieve its military objec-
tives, it suffered heavy casualties, mostly in the ranks of the volunteers 
and Pasdaran who were reluctant to follow the plans and directives of 
the professional officers and threw themselves into the battles and 
superior fire-power of the Iraqi forces. 
The fifth phase, November 1982 to the present, has been a long-term 
stalemate. By the beginning of 1983 Iraq had acquired air superiority and 
found it easier than Iran to acquire arms from abroad. Through a 
foreign policy which ignored even minimal consideration for factors of 
interdependence and whose main function seemed to be making enemies, 
Iran had managed to alienate the overwhelming majority of the interna-
tional community and to create a tacit cooperation against itself and in 
favor of Iraq even between such adversaries as the United States and the 
Soviet Union, despite the fact that during most of the period the latter 
governments were so suspicious of each other that they refused to 
negotiate on a number of issues of mutual concern. 
The costs of the war have been enormous by any standard. More 
than 300,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed in the battlefields or 
in bombardments. The author estimates that a minimum of 1,000,000 
have been wounded and maimed and there are already more than 
3,000,000 refugees." The cohort of boys and young men is decimated, 
and those of this group who have so far survived have received little or 
no meaningful training and education, a matter which will be highly 
detrimental to the future of the two countries. Much of the mining, in-
dustrial and service enterprises and infrastructure are either totally ruin-
ed or substantially damaged. It is difficult to estimate the actual and the 
lost opportunity costs of this war, but the range of $550 to $600 billion 
appears reasonable for the economic costs. This implies that even if the 
war ends in late 1985-early 1986, which is likely because of war weariness 
and fatigue, it will take the countries until the year 2005 to return to 
where they were in 1980, if every man, woman and child saves $500.00 
per annum to be devoted solely to rectifying the damages of the war." 
Furthermore, the war has contributed to reducing world dependence on 
the Persian Gulf oil and has substantially increased production by Bri-
tain and Mexico (from less than 1.8 million barrels daily in 1977 to more 
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than 5.5 million in the first half of 1984) in a shrinking market. Such pro-
duction is likely, at least in the short run, to reduce the need for the Gulf 
supplies even further and seriously damage the capability of Iran and 
Iraq to reconstruct their economies." 
Despite its immense costs, the war has not been productive in terms 
of the objectives initially sought by the belligerents. There is little pro-
bability that Iran's objective of overthrowing the Ba'th regime and 
replacing it with a government of the Ayatollahs choosing, which was 
the main cause of Iraq's decision to invade Iran, can be achieved. By the 
summer of 1982, when Iran had expelled the invading forces from its ter-
ritory and Iraq and its Persian Gulf allies had indicated willingness to 
honor the Algiers Agreement and pay reparation to Iran, the war could 
have ended on terms rather favorable to the latter." But, instead of en-
ding the war, Iran decided to invade Iraq and bring about a change of 
government in that country by direct use of Iranian armed forces. Conse-
quently, it made the clearly unacceptable demands of $150 billion (rather 
than the proposed $30 to $50 billion) in reparation and the removal of 
Saddam as preconditions to a cease-fire. The Iranian leaders assumed 
that since their military, disarrayed as a result of periodic purges of the 
officers and arbitrary decisions about weapon systems by the revolution, 
had been able to defeat the Iraqi forces in Khuzistan, it would have little 
difficulty, with its improved morale and organizaton, in defeating a 
weakened and more disabled Iraqi military on the other side of the 
border. This reasoning by the Iranian leadership, developed along the 
same line as that of the Western military specialists stated at the outset of 
this paper, proved wrong and disastrous." 
Two major difficulties beset this type of reasoning. The first arises 
from the fact that the usual estimates of military capability do not take 
the nature of the objectives sought into account. This, in turn, means 
that all meticulous estimates of power are likely to be deficient, because 
one unit of a given military force on one side does not necessarily equal 
one unit of the same force on the other side. The side whose objective is 
the defense of its own homeland, for example, has superiority over the 
side which is engaged in invasion. This proposition is verified not only by 
the Iran-Iraq War, but also by the Vietnam and the Afghan Wars. While 
it was unfathomable for the forces of North Vietnam and Vietcong to 
have even contemplated an invasion of the United States, they were 
strong enough to defend themselves against the United States in their 
own territory. The Mujahedeen, too, organized in the present form could 
not pose the slightest threat to the Soviet territory, although they have so 
far been able to frustrate Soviet objectives and to inflict fairly substantial 
casualties on the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 
The second difficulty arises from insufficient conceptual focus on 
the changed nature of the international context in assessing the utility of 
resort to military force. Increasing interdependence, reflected in the net-
works of mutually beneficial transactions among states, has made resort 
to military force more dysfunctional and counterproductive than ever 
before. This counterproductiveness prevails not only because of the 
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Strategie dimension of interdependence and the cost and questionable 
utility of resort to military force for the achievement of objectives, but 
also because resort to force severs many mutually beneficial transactions 
with the adversary and strains relations with a number of third parties 
that have mutually beneficial relations with target states.20 Iran, for ex-
ample, had a greater probability of defeating Iraq in the period after the 
summer of 1982, if the two states had been left alone or received equal 
access to arms from abroad. But this assumes a different international 
context than the prevailing one. In view of the strategic and economic 
dimensions of interdependence, the rest of the world, particularly the 
Arab states of the Gulf and their friends, would not let Iraq be defeated. 
These dimensions of interdependence also, to a great extent, account for 
the support received by the Vietcong during the Vietnam War and by the 
Mujahedeen in the current Afghan war. 
Iran's inability to achieve its objectives has already been noted. In 
assessing elite rationality, it should be considered that Iraq, too, has been 
unable — and has no prospects at present or in the foreseeable future of 
being able — to achieve its expressed invasion objectives, which con-
sisted of changing the regime of Khomeini and "liberating" Khuzistan. 
To the extent that rationality means the efficient use of resources for the 
attainment of objectives, there is little comfort in the behavior of the Ira-
nian and Iraqi leaders regarding Buena de Mesquita's assumption of ra-
tionality, which has been accepted a priori by most traditional scholars. 
It may be argued that the leaders of Iran and Iraq are aberrations and 
that those of the rest of the world have been rational in their resort to 
military force. An examination of the empirical data does not appear 
very promising for this position. Aside from such clear cases as World 
War I, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, the Japanese invasion of 
Pearl Harbor (despite Russett's illuminating contribution in this connec-
tion),21 and the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, as many states, if not 
more, have lost wars as have won them, with other wars becoming 
stalemates after heavy costs. This implies that the probability of govern-
ments being rational (in the sense used by Buena de Mesquita and tradi-
tional scholars) has been less than a probability based on a toss of a coin. 
Hopefully, other leaders are somewhat more rational than their Iranian 
and Iraqi counterparts, but given the latter's level of rationality, this 
would not constitute a great feat. The assumption of elite rationality is 
even more curious in view of the mushrooming psychological studies 
regarding the effects of ethnocentrism, misperception, motivation and 
stress on the leaders22 and their reluctance, even where feasible, to in-
crease their rational capacity by the greater use of such available models 
as those proposed by Graham Allison and Alexander George.23 
The course of the Iran-Iraq War suggests that despite its general 
dysfunction, the utility of resort to military force remains high for the 
achievement of one set of objectives, that is, the defense of one's ter-
ritory and regime against external invasion. This type of objective also 
seems to have a multiplier effect upon the available military resources in 
favor of the defender and against the invader. It is essential, however, to 
distinguish the defense of one's territory, as proposed here, from the way 
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in which the term "defense" has been used by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in justifying their intervention in such areas as Vietnam and 
Afghanistan. 
Military force can still be successful in invading the territories of 
other states, provided that the territories to be invaded are within easy 
access and the military disparities are immense and, therefore, that the 
multiplier effect of defense of territory upon military resources can be 
easily overcome. The cases of Iran's invasion of the three islands in the 
Gulf and of the United States' invasion of Grenada are illustrative ex-
amples. The Falklands War also seems to substantiate these proposi-
tions. First, the Falklands War eventually ended in favor of the defender. 
Second, while Argentina was close to its invasion target and enjoyed suf-
ficient superiority over the meager resources of the Islands, it did not en-
joy such superiority over the forces of the United Kingdom and the 
Islands combined. Third, the war was costly and caused substantial 
losses to both parties. Argentina was unable to achieve its objectives 
despite its human and economic losses; and Britain's objective was 
achieved at the cost of billions of dollars, a cost which still continues to 
sap British economic resources.24 
Finally, it is useful to address briefly the issues of "resolve" or com-
mitment, which is usually offered as the cause for failure of the superior 
military power, measured in the traditional manner, to achieve its objec-
tives. Aside from the fact that the exact nature of this resolve is not ade-
quately explained by those who propose it, there are three main points 
worth noting. First, it is not shown how this resolve can be generated 
when the people of a country do not support the policies of their elites. It 
is very doubtful, for example, that Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson or 
Richard M. Nixon lacked resolve in Vietnam, nor has the Ayatollah 
shown the slightest lack of resolve in his wish to overthrow the Ba'th 
regime in Iraq. Yet, while his much mentioned gateiyat (decisiveness) was 
good enough without any armies for the overthrow of the Shah and was 
sufficient, with his disarrayed forces, for defense against the Iraqi inva-
sion, it has not been good enough, even with improved armed forces and 
organization, for achieving his objectives in Iraq. Second, resolve is not 
limited to one side in a war, it can be increased by the other side as well. 
Third, resolve can be counterproductive and disastrous if the resources 
are not appropriate for the objectives sought in the existing international 
and domestic contexts. As David Baldwin has demonstrated, power is 
not fungible in politics as money is in economics." In politics, resources 
that can be functional in one case may be inappropriate or even counter-
productive in another. To use an analogy, four deuces, or four threes, 
constitute a powerful hand if one is engaged in a game of poker, but they 
constitute the weakest cards if one plays bridge. The best resolve in the 
latter case is restraint. 
CONCLUSIONS 
By examining the Iran-Iraq War from a comparative perspective, 
this paper has raised a number of questions regarding the prevailing 
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method of assessing capability in terms of meticulously calculated 
military forces and weapon systems. 
The common methods of calculating military force have been defi-
cient for at least three reasons. First, they do not relate resources to the 
nature of the objectives sought. In this connection, it has been illustrated 
that the same unit of military force has considerably more weight when it 
is used for the defense of one's territory against external invasion than 
when used offensively for invasion. This may be primarily attributed to 
the role of beliefs and values. Whether because of nationalism or 
religion, the defense of one's territory evokes greater commitment and 
sacrifice than fighting and dying in a remote land and culture, even if it is 
done in the name of defense. 
Second, the common modes of calculating military force do not ade-
quately account for the changing nature of the international context. It 
appears that not only the strategic, but also the economic, dimension of 
interdependence has substantially affected the utility of resort to military 
force. Its costs have increased and its benefits do not in most instances 
seem commensurate with the costs. 
Third, the effectiveness of superior military force is based on the 
assumption of rationality of the states, which implies the rationality of 
their foreign policy elites. To the extent that rationality means the effi-
cient use of resources for the purpose of achieving objectives, it was 
noted that the a priori assumption of the rationality of governments can-
not be empirically sustained. The persistence of this assumption seems 
particularly puzzling in light of the burgeoning psychological studies on 
the effects of such factors as ethnocentrism, misperception and motiva-
tion. The best that can be said is that the degree of elite rationality, or ir-
rationality, may vary from state to state and from decision to decision in 
the case of the same elite. 
Author's Note 
•This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1984 Convention of the In-
ternational Studies Association, Atlanta. 
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